Even when regulatory capital is ample, concentration could constrain loss-absorbing capacity first. A large loan would consume capital, liquidity, and loss-absorbing capacity that would then be out of reach for the rest of the portfolio. If the transfer rate covers only funding and interest rate risk, that consumption could be left out of the price. The bank could charge its largest borrower as it charges a small one. With a Capital Allocation Decision System, the aim would b

If credit deteriorates, it would be worth checking whether expected losses on new cohorts exceed those built into the price. Pricing and origination could incorporate that deterioration with a lag. The current recovery cost could differ from the one used when the loans were priced. Whoever decides origination would need to check whether they receive that cost or whether recovery is managed only as an operation. With internal data, they could compare expected losses on new coh

If the premises arrive set from the top and the areas contribute no binding constraints, the plan may allocate a figure instead of discovering it. Targets, budget, and ambition would form a second-order system, whose output would be the objective function of the other systems. A process in which everyone participates and no real constraint can move the result would be integrated and would lack the capacity to decide. Participating is different from deciding. Its reopening tri

If the capital charge is set once a year, origination that deviates may make it inadequate before its next update. With the capital charge given as a number, the credit area would price loans without resolving each transaction jointly with the balance-sheet core. If a month's origination materially changes marginal capital consumption, by the third week the charge may no longer be the right one. The problem may lie in the cadence, in the methodology, or in both. Under that as

The transfer price would coordinate rates and funding. Where it leaves a resource out, or charges for it with a static average, the areas could go back to deciding on their own. In its matched-maturity form, the transfer price assigns each transaction an internal rate that carries the bank's funding cost and is set at origination. The margin would thus be protected from the interest rate and funding risk that the price transfers. That would be the case in which coordination b

MEXICO · FINANCIAL SYSTEM An InsightIA note · September 2026 · figures as of July 31, 2026 · reissue of October 12, 2026 At the end of July, the capitalization ratio of the 4 largest banks ranges from 19.3% to 24.4%, and their fundamental capital ratio from 12.7% to 18.8%. What changed On September 18, 2026, the Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores [CNBV] (National Banking and Securities Commission) published the capitalization indicators of commercial banks, with figures

Mexico's 16 midsize banks operate with less scale than the large ones, and a coordination error among the areas that decide their balance sheet would weigh more heavily on their results [H]. We start from a premise that public figures do not prove: midsize banks have the committees that decide the balance sheet—assets and liabilities, pricing, risk— [H] (section 7). Over the past year, 12-month return on equity (ROE) fell at 13 of the 16 [D]; the average liquidity coverage ra

Evidence markers: [V] verified · [D] derived · [E] estimate with an explicit assumption · [H] unproven hypothesis A universal bank makes many decisions, and a few of them compete for the same resources, consume the same constraints, and change the state on which the others are made. When each one is resolved within its own area and against its own target, the bank can end up with decisions that are locally correct and jointly inconsistent [H]. This Perspective proposes a map